About two years ago, in May 2024, Nikolai Patrushev — one of Putin's best and longest-surviving allies — left, or was removed from, his position as Secretary of the Russian Security Council. He had worked there for nearly a decade and a half, and before that he had been director of the FSB since 1999. Patrushev is a hard-liner who pushes the continuing war in Ukraine, confrontation with the West, and the most aggressive forms of Russian irredentism. The scholar Mark Galeotti called him the “figure in Vladimir Putin's inner circle who scares me the most.”
So why was he removed? Maybe, as some — including Russian commentator and former Putin speechwriter Abbas Gallyamov — suggested, this was linked to Patrushev's support for starting the disastrous war in Ukraine. Maybe. But Putin is showing no other signs of doubting his aggression, or punishing or re-shuffling those who supported him in starting the full-scale invasion. Maybe it's his age — time for Patrushev to retire. That might be possible too, except Patrushev is 74 and Putin is 73. Patrushev does look older than Putin (maybe because of some aversion to plastic surgery), but it would not be a great look for Putin to retire one of his oldest allies because of age.
As time has gone by, we think the answer has emerged, and it has to do with Russia's weakness in shipbuilding. Patrushev was not put out to pasture. He was put in charge of a newly-formed body, the “Russian Maritime Collegium,” to focus on shipbuilding and seaborne trade. This body is likely critical to the long-term plans of Russia's leadership.
An industrial basket case at sea
Shipbuilding? The ancient technology of moving things on water? This is what Russia's leadership is worried about? Yes. Russia is much more of an industrial basket case than many in the West realize. Its shipbuilding capabilities have deteriorated massively since the 1960s — a rot that began even before the collapse of the USSR — and its infamous “shadow fleet” of oil tankers is mostly made up of old clunkers that would otherwise have been sold for scrap. A bunch of ship owners, especially some Greek ones, made a lot of money in 2022 by selling their old tankers to Russia. If Western powers had been more on the ball back then, they might have prevented the existence of Russia's shadow fleet altogether and dealt a body blow to a huge section of Russia's income.
In 2016, 80% of Russia's oil exports were by sea (as opposed to via pipeline), and all indications are that this proportion has at least stayed high since then, and perhaps grown. The Kyiv School of Economics estimated that 70% of all Russian oil exports in 2024 went via Russia's shadow fleet. This aging fleet is falling apart, weighed down by other sanctions actions and occasional attacks from Ukrainian drone boats.
Eventually, this fleet will age out. What then? If Russia has not repaired its relationship with the West, it will have to get its ships elsewhere. It can't produce them itself — maybe not even if the existence of Russia depended on it. Even beyond oil tankers, Russia's Buyan-class corvettes are all powered by Chinese knockoffs of German maritime diesel engines. Its ice-resistant LNG carriers are all from South Korea. If there is no sanctions relief, then Russia's fleets will eventually either collapse or become wholly dependent on China. That could have disastrous long-term effects on Russia's ability to export oil — and therefore on the Russian state budget.
Patrushev says the quiet part out loud
Even Patrushev has admitted this sorry state of affairs in Russian shipbuilding. In an April 2025 interview in Kommersant, even while lying about Russia's supposedly amazing naval shipbuilding capabilities, he confessed:
It must be acknowledged that numerous problems have accumulated in the (Russian) civilian maritime sector, and they will need to be addressed for years to come. While the Navy has managed to preserve and expand many capabilities, civilian shipbuilding and ship repair have long been plagued by the illusion that everything could be ordered cheaper and easier abroad. Entire shipbuilding sectors in some countries have grown significantly thanks to Russian orders, but now, in the face of sanctions, they've begun refusing orders from Russian shipowners.
In April, Patrushev announced the creation of the Aleksey Krylov National Shipbuilding Research Center. This is going to start as a re-organization of the Krylov State Research Center in St. Petersburg, but according to Patrushev, the Krylov Center was supposed to be similar to the Kurchatov Institute (Russia's national nuclear research center) and the Zhukovsky Institute (Russia's national aviation research center). That might be a big tell about how important this issue has become for Russia: shipbuilding is being put in the same category as nuclear weapons and energy research, which Russia's leadership sees as existential technologies, and aircraft development. Russia is desperate to maintain an independent aircraft industry, and the impact of sanctions on Russian commercial aviation demonstrates why.
Why Patrushev went to India
Patrushev's visit to India in November of last year takes on a new light. When he was there, he offered the Indians joint projects in shipbuilding, ship repair, and crew training. Russia is likely searching for ways to maintain a shipbuilding window on the West with India. Russia's main partner is China, and China may fill the gap that Russia needs, but Russia probably wants options. India is a more likely place for Russia to maintain access to Western shipbuilding and maintenance technology, and to piggyback on any Indian subsidies.
Imagine a Russia wholly dependent on Chinese shipbuilding for its oil tankers. China could economically coerce Russia into needing regular special maintenance for its fleet, prioritize building pipelines to China where China dictates the long-term price, or even eventually mandate that only Chinese or Chinese-built ships can bring Russian oil to Chinese ports. That would accelerate Russia's transformation into an extension of China and, in the long term, even contribute to the loss of Russia's Far Eastern Territories.
Where this leaves the West — and us
The United States has its own troubles with shipbuilding, but we also have a deep magazine of allies like South Korea and Japan who will happily build any of the ships we need. (Well, we had them — the current administration is trying to turn us into Russia in this respect, too.)
By making war on the West, Russia's leadership is shooting itself in the foot. Without Western technology and capital, the best they can hope for is to become a Chinese colony, or a northern European North Korea. Western policymakers and investors should take note: as long as Russia is ruled by this crew of kleptocrats, it will be a risky proposition for investment and a disastrous proposition as an ally.
The importance of Russian shipbuilding also gives us a clue about where to put pressure on the Russian system. Attacks against the Shadow Fleet, and against Russia's ability to service it, may have broader long-term effects than just disrupting oil flows.
We at DKP are working on this. Stay tuned.